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THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY 

TRANSFER 
Charles F. Nicholson 1
 ABSTRACT 
An agribusiness focus has emerged in public discussions as way to enhance agricultural 
production in Indonesia and to improve sustainable income for farmers.  The focus has led to increased 
attention on marketing. Marketing agricultural products via processing technologies can indeed address 
national objectives of rural poverty alleviation. REI-Indonesia observed that limited marketing 
alternatives are frequently mentioned by farmers as a significant constraint. In Indonesia, a significant 
amount of institutional support currently exists for the ideas presented in this paper.  In particular, one 
should consider the multifaceted mission of agricultural development in Indonesia, which includes: (a) 
policies that encourage competition and, therefore, create welfare improvements; (b) the creation of 
new processing enterprises that increase competition; (c) the establishment of processing facilities that 
are owned and operated by farmer cooperatives; and (d) the utilization of government resources to 
assess processing technologies. Thus, the mission of agricultural development, as articulated by the 
Department of Agriculture, already encompasses in a broad way the specific agenda presented here. 
This paper provides the rationale behind a specific program that is directed toward mission goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An agribusiness focus has emerged in public discussions as way to enhance agricultural 
production in Indonesia and to improve sustainable income for farmers.  Such a focus has motivated 
much research on farmer institutions and marketing.  The agribusiness focus has led to increased 
attention on marketing, since marketing issues have a major impact on the incomes of agricultural 
households. In general, food processing of one sort or another has emerged as a possible marketing 
strategy that can improve agricultural household income. Indeed, processing agricultural produce 
creates added value, which, if captured by agricultural households, promises to raise living standards 
for a large segment of the rural population. Processing holds the additional benefit of potentially 
employing landless workers, who are isolated from any general improvements in agriculture.  Thus, 
marketing agricultural products via processing technologies can indeed address national objectives of 
rural poverty alleviation. 
At the household level as well, marketing issues represent a major concern. Utilizing an 
approach that invited farmer participation in agricultural training and technology transfer, REI-
Indonesia observed that limited marketing alternatives are frequently mentioned by farmers as a 
significant constraint.  Budianto and Zaini (2003) report results of a nationwide set of participatory 
rural appraisals among rice farmers that show that price issues are among the chief concerns for most 
of the participating farmers, earning the top ranking of all the mentioned issues.  Price and profitability 
issues are prominent concerns among non-rice farmers, too.  A thorough assessment of farmers’ 
complaints of low output price levels requires an analysis of the downstream marketing channels for a 
given agricultural product in a particular area. 
In West Java, a considerable amount of market power is wielded by retailers for a wide range of 
fresh produce commodities, including fruits and vegetables. In such markets, farmers typically receive 
only a third of the final marketed value (Kasryno, 2003).  If the final product is marketed through a 
supermarket, the farmer’s share of marketed value drops to 20%.  These observations raise the 
suspicion that downstream market channels are characterized by imperfect competition.2 Where 
imperfect competition exists in any stage of marketing, welfare losses will attenuate progress in 
agricultural development. As a preliminary response to farmers’ marketing concerns, this paper will 
focus attention on the theoretical issues of imperfect competition and its impact on agricultural 
technology transfer. 
An investigation of the way markets affect agricultural technology transfer will shed light on 
possible courses of action. In particular, the role of the regional AIAT offices can be enhanced by 
setting before them the task of improving competition in local agricultural markets.  By utilizing AIAT 
the resources that are resident in the post-harvest and socio-economic departments, many market 
structure issues can be addressed. By successfully combating imperfect competition, strategies for 
agricultural technology transfer will be more fruitful. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section A will discuss the basic elements of a 
theory of imperfect competition and the way in which agricultural technology transfer is affected by 
2 The fact that processors enjoy a generous spread between the price they pay for the agricultural good and the price 
they obtain for the processed good does not, in itself, imply imperfect competition.  As risk averse processors bear 
price risk they must exact a premium to compensate for the uncertainty.  For instance, Schroeter and Azzam 
(1991) show that the marketing margins of U.S. meatpackers included a significant component that was due to 
price uncertainty. Contracts that shift risk-bearing of agricultural prices from the farmer to the processor must 
include an expected profit for the processor that at least covers processing costs and price uncertainty.
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market structure. Section B will describe the practice of market analysis and point out specific 
instances where agricultural technology transfer has been adversely affected by imperfect competition. 
Section C will present general conclusions that suggest a research program, which focuses on the role 
of farmer processing cooperatives in enhancing competition in local agricultural markets and in 
generating additional rural income. 
BASIC THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
In environments where imperfect competition exists in the farmers’ output market, the farmers’ 
share of marketed value decreases relative to the competitive outcome.  Where agricultural produce is 
marketed as fresh produce or where the agricultural produce is processed into a manufactured product, 
downstream market power reduces the farmers’ share of the marketed value.  A strategy that increases
competition in the output market holds out the hope that the resulting welfare improvements will create 
more and better development, particularly in rural areas. 
In addition to the welfare losses of imperfect competition, further detrimental effects occur in the 
area of technical innovation.  In this section, we will see that imperfect competition diminishes the 
benefits of agricultural technology transfer to farmers.  In particular, we will consider the following 
question: How does the adoption of improved technology in a market environment that is 
characterized by imperfect competition impact aggregate rural incomes or aggregate rural output?   
In order to shed light on this topic we will appeal to the two extreme cases of pure monopsony 
and perfect competition. Monopsony occurs when the demand of an agricultural product is used 
exclusively by a food manufacturer3.  Figure 1 shows the demand of the agricultural product, which is 
derived from the food manufacturer’s production function and represents the food manufacturer’s 
marginal benefit of the agricultural good as it produces a processed good.  The demand for the 
agricultural commodity is therefore the value of the marginal product (VMP) of the agricultural good. 
The supply of the agricultural good is derived from the growers’ effort to minimize the cost of 
producing a specific quantity of the agricultural good.  The supply of the agricultural good is the 
minimum cost incurred by the grower as his output increases one unit, i.e. the marginal cost (MC).   
MO 
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Figure 1.  Graphical depiction of monopsony pricing 
3 Although the comparative static effects of the oligopsony model differs from the pure monopsony model presented 
here, shifts in supply, which is the focus of this paper, give rise to effects that are qualitatively the same in both 
models.  See Chen and Lent (1992) for a thorough analysis of the supply effects in the oligopsony model.
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Under perfect competition, neither the food manufacturer(s) nor the growers can influence the 
market price of the agricultural good.  A Walrasian market emerges and yields a price that clears the 
market where VMP=MC. The competitive equilibrium price is PC and the market output is QC.  Total 
sales of the agricultural product will be PCQC, which represents the aggregate income earned by the 
farmers. 
A different result emerges when the food manufacturer is the only buyer of the agricultural 
product and can, therefore, influence the market price.  As the quantity purchased by the food 
manufacturer increases by one unit, the price that he pays for that extra unit also increases, according 
to the growers’ supply schedule. Consequently, the food manufacturer’s marginal expenditures (or 
marginal outlays, MO) on the agricultural good are not the same as the supply curve that is generated 
by the farmers’ cost structure. As a result, the optimal amount of the agricultural good for the food 
manufacturer is much lower than the optimal amount under perfect competition.  The food 
manufacturer will purchase an amount of the agricultural good, Q0, where VMP = MO.  Note that the 
farmers’ income has dropped to P0Q0 from the competitive outcome of PCQC. 
Now consider what happens when the growers adopt a cost-reducing technology, which 
effectively shifts down their supply schedule.  Figure 2 presents in graphical form the market outcome 
of agricultural technology transfer. Note that the competitive outcome includes higher output and 
lower price. For this outcome to imply an increase in rural income, the demand curve must be elastic. 
That is, an inelastic demand will result in lower aggregate sales.  Now observe that under imperfect 
competition output also increases with an improvement in technology but by a lower amount, 
demonstrating that imperfect competition reduces the output effect of agricultural technology transfer. 
Note also that both P1 and P0 decrease but P0 decreases by a larger amount than P1, showing that the 
benefits of farmers’ adoption of cost-reducing technologies accrues mainly to the processor, not the 
farmer. 
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Figure 2.  The effect of the adoption of a cost-reducing agricultural technology 
When imperfect competition characterizes the market faced by agricultural producers, there will 
be relatively little increase in agricultural output after the adoption of effective agricultural technology. 
Consequently, farmers’ incentives to adopt improved technologies are greatly reduced when their only 
marketing alternatives are those that are characterized by imperfect competition.  In this way, market 
Q0 QC 
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characteristics can have a notable impact on agricultural technology transfer, as well as on poverty 
alleviation efforts. 
Now let’s change the market structure in two important ways.  First, assume that a marketing 
cooperative was organized among farmers, such that farmers became owner operators of a processing 
facility. Assume further that enough of these cooperatives formed to eradicate imperfect competition. 
Second, assume that technology transfer efforts included processing technologies so that the demand 
for the agricultural product shifted up. Figure 3 presents the theoretical effects of such a scenario. 
Technical innovation at the processing level increases demand for agricultural products.  If 
competition prevails in the market, both PC and QC increase, producing unambiguous increases in 
aggregate rural income. Now compare the new competitive outcome with the monopsony case, where 
the pre-shift outcome was P0 and Q0. It is apparent that the benefits are huge when increased 
competition is combined with technology transfer at the processing stage.  In addition, landless 
workers can be included in processing, creating important employment opportunities.  The scenario 
that was just described is consistent with a strategy that provides technical information regarding 
processing to farmer organizations as they organize at the processing stage. 
Fostering farmer-operated food manufacturing can create a host of benefits.  First, by placing an 
increased portion of the value added in the hands of farmers, the incomes of those households will 
increase. Second, by a deliberate attempt to increase competition, rural markets will become more 
efficient. Third, as markets become more efficient, development efforts, like technology transfer to 
growers and processors, will generate greater benefits.  Thus, a strategy that aggressively confronts 
imperfect competition in agricultural markets, encourages grower involvement in food processing and 
develops efficient technologies of production and processing in those markets promises to make a 
significant impact on agricultural and rural development. 
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Figure 3.  The effect of the adoption of a cost-reducing processor technology 
ANALYSIS IN PRACTISE 
In this section we consider ways to address issues of market structure so that multiple goals of 
development might be attained, including the enhancement of agricultural technology transfer, the 
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promotion of manufacturing in rural areas and the reduction of imperfect competition.  All of these 
goals can be obtained with the resources and structures that are embodied in the agencies of the 
Indonesian Agency for Agricultural Research and Development. 
Much previous work has been done that can provide direction for future analysis.  In particular, 
the impact of market structure on technical innovations in agriculture has already received attention. 
For instance, by analyzing the impact of the adoption of mechanical harvesters in California from 1963 
to 1967, Just and Chern (1980) provide evidence that imperfect competition existed in the market for 
California tomatoes. Moreover, they provided one of the earliest treatments of the effect of market 
structure on the potential impact of supply shifts, which include the impact of agricultural technology 
transfer. Huang and Sexton (1996) analyze a similar market in Taiwan, showing that adoption of the 
same technology (mechanical harvesters) created benefits mainly for processors, not farmers.  They 
also showed that imperfect competition was the main culprit behind the eroded benefits of agricultural 
technology transfer. Previous work has demonstrated that the particular market environment can play 
a role in either enhancing or attenuating the benefits of agricultural technology transfer and innovation. 
Aside from the impact on agricultural technology transfer, market structure also influences the 
potential of income-generation in rural areas. The literature exposes the detrimental welfare effects 
caused by imperfect competition.  Specifically, in the processing tomato market in Taiwan, imperfect 
competition has resulted in large losses for farmers that amount to two-thirds of the benefits attainable 
under perfect competition (Huang and Sexton, 1996).  Indeed, the verified existence of imperfect 
competition is identical to the verification of welfare losses. 
It is important to note, however, that market structures can change.  Public policy that encourages
competition can effectively address welfare losses due to imperfect competition.  In the California 
processing tomato market, for instance, no significant level of imperfect competition was observed 
during the 1980’s (Durham and Sexton, 1992), which was two decades after the Just and Chern study, 
which provided evidence of imperfect competition. Indeed, public policy that stimulates competition 
(eg. reducing barriers to entry) will create a dynamic market environment that can reduce imperfect 
competition (Durham, et al, 1996). An evolving market structure that becomes more competitive over 
time offers hope that in Indonesia, too, agricultural and industrial policies that promote competition in 
all stages of marketing can successfully create environments where technology transfer efforts bolster 
national welfare. 
In practice, then, a synergy exists between agricultural market assessment and agricultural 
technology assessment. Analysis that focuses on specific local markets and specific local technologies 
represents an area of endeavour that is particularly suitable for the regional Assessment Institute for 
Agricultural Technology (AIAT) offices.  In particular, the post-harvest department of the AIAT 
offices can play an important role in the assessment of processing technologies.  Similarly, the socio-
economic department of the AIAT offices can play a role in the assessment of market structure, while 
the agricultural production department can play a role in agricultural technology assessment.  By 
combining resources in this way the AIAT offices can perform a more thorough analysis that 
recommends cost-reducing agricultural technology, cost-reducing processing technology and pro-
competition measures. 
THE ROLE OF FARMER COOPERATIVES 
Having uncovered the detrimental effects of imperfect competition and having considered ways 
to conduct analysis, we turn our attention to possible solutions that could either solve the problem of 
imperfect competition or provide additional direction in the analysis stage.  Both as a potential solution 
and as a research direction, collective action among farmers offers hopeful prospects. 
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In an environment of imperfect competition, farmers have incentive to act collectively to secure 
more value.  Such collective action represents a special case of vertical coordination that captures lost
efficiency while it generates procompetitive influences. Specifically, if farmers realize that their 
agricultural good is underutilized because of imperfect competition, there is incentive for vertical 
coordination between growers and processors (Azzam, 1996).  Collectively negotiated contracts are 
one way to create more vertical coordination and seize greater benefits for both the growers and the 
4processors.
Alternatively, farmers can form marketing collectives that process their own produce.  Sexton 
(1990) shows that farmer cooperatives can provide a procompetitive influence on markets that are 
characterized by imperfect competition. Therefore, public policies that are favourable toward 
cooperatives can indirectly enhance competition and, therefore, bolster the impact of farmers’ adoption 
of cost-reducing agricultural technologies. When a processing farmer cooperative enters the market, 
imperfect competition is reduced, allowing the efficiency gains of competition to be realized.5 Thus, 
an effort to organize farmers around a processing enterprise promises to create at least 3 benefits of 
increased competition, namely increased rural income through increased product sales, increased rural 
income through the capture of additional value added in the processing stage and enhanced welfare 
effects of agricultural technology transfer to farmers. 
In Indonesia, a significant amount of institutional support currently exists for the ideas presented 
in this paper. In particular, one should consider the multifaceted mission of agricultural development 
in Indonesia 6, which includes 
1.	 “synchronizing policy to encourage the development of every agribusiness sub-system to develop 
strongly and harmoniously” 
2.	 “facilitating and stimulating the development of agribusiness enterprises . . . both on-farm and 
off-farm (i.e. cultivation, processing and marketing) and stimulating the development of business 
partnerships” 
3.	 “promoting the development of farmers’ economic organizations and business networks in 
agricultural upstream and downstream industries” 
4.	 “developing location specific and environment friendly technology innovation, either on 
upstream industry, on-farm business or agricultural downstream industry” 
Note that number 1 presumably includes policies that encourage competition and, therefore, 
create welfare improvements.  Number 2 includes the creation of new processing enterprises that 
increase competition. Number 3 includes the establishment of processing facilities that are owned and 
operated by farmer cooperatives. Number 4 includes the utilization of government resources to assess 
processing technologies. Thus, the mission of agricultural development, as articulated by the 
Department of Agriculture, already encompasses in a broad way the specific agenda presented here. 
This paper provides the rationale behind a specific program that is directed toward mission goals. 
4 Note that the existence of contracts between growers and processors does not prove the existence of imperfect competition.  Vertical coordination can arise for a host of reasons, 
including specialized assets (Williamson, 1985), uncertain supply (Carlton, 1979) and information asymmetry (Hennessy, 1996).  Frank and Henderson (1992) show that vertical
coordination arises mainly from the effort to reduce transaction costs, which only partly refer to the internalization of production and processing inefficiencies, like those that occur 
under imperfect competition. 
5 Although one study found that “increases in the share of product handled by marketing cooperatives did not appear to increase competitiveness in the raw product market.” (p. 990, 
Wann and Sexton, 1992), it is certainly the case that an increase in the number of marketing cooperatives will increase competitiveness. 
6 Taken from Budianto and Zaini (2003) 
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